Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Algorithm Engineering

Probability and Computing – Game Theory & Yao's Principle

Stefan Walzer | WS 2024/2025



Lecture Notes by Worsch

Some of this lecture's content is covered in Thomas Worsch's notes from 2019. 

Content

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Prisoner's Dilemma

		-1\-1	-3\0
		0\-3	-2\-2

Prisoner's Dilemma



Setting

- *strategies* and available to both *players*
- table shows *payoffs* for players depending on chosen strategies
- here: always better to choose
  ↪ pair (,) is unique *equilibrium*

Definition: Equilibrium

Combination of strategies such that no one can profit by unilaterally switching his or her own strategy.

A cat and mouse game



Someone always regrets their decision

		reaction

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

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

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

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		reaction
cheese	cheese	mouse should have played yarn
yarn	cheese	cat should have played yarn
yarn	yarn	mouse should have played cheese

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

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

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↪ No combination of *pure* strategies is an *equilibrium*.

Equilibrium

Combination of strategies such that no one can profit by unilaterally switching his or her own strategy.

Nash Equilibria

What a Game *is*

- Finite sets S_1, S_2 of *pure strategies*.
- Utility functions $u_1, u_2 : S_1 \times S_2 \to \mathbb{R}$.

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How a Game is played

- Players pick a strategy simultaneously
  $\hookrightarrow$ gives pair $(s_1, s_2) \in S_1 \times S_2$.
- player 1 gets payoff $u_1(s_1, s_2)$ and
  player 2 gets payoff $u_2(s_1, s_2)$.

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Existence of Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria

There exist distributions $\mathcal{S}_1^*$ on S_1 and $\mathcal{S}_2^*$ on S_2, called *mixed strategies* such that $(\mathcal{S}_1^*, \mathcal{S}_2^*)$ is an equilibrium:

player 1 cannot increase expected payoff: $\mathbb{E}_{s_1 \sim \mathcal{S}_1^*, s_2 \sim \mathcal{S}_2^*}[u_1(s_1, s_2)] = \max_{s_1 \in S_1} \mathbb{E}_{s_2 \sim \mathcal{S}_2^*}[u_1(s_1, s_2)]$.

player 2 cannot increase expected payoff: $\mathbb{E}_{s_1 \sim \mathcal{S}_1^*, s_2 \sim \mathcal{S}_2^*}[u_2(s_1, s_2)] = \max_{s_2 \in S_2} \mathbb{E}_{s_1 \sim \mathcal{S}_1^*}[u_2(s_1, s_2)]$.

Nash Equilibria

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Remark: Theorem holds for $n \geq 3$ players as well.

Nash Equilibrium in Cat & Mouse Game

		-4\2	2\1
		0\0	0\1

Equilibrium

$\mathcal{S}_{\text{mouse}} = \{ : \frac{1}{2}, : \frac{1}{2}\}$

$\mathcal{S}_{\text{cat}} = \{ : \frac{1}{3}, : \frac{2}{3}\}$

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Verification of Equilibrium Property: Calculating Expected Payoffs

for :

- playing gives expected payoff $\frac{1}{3} \cdot (-4) + \frac{2}{3} \cdot 2 = 0$
- playing gives expected payoff $\frac{1}{3} \cdot 0 + \frac{2}{3} \cdot 0 = 0$
- playing $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mouse}}$ is a mix of both
  $\hookrightarrow$ also expected payoff 0.

for :

- playing gives expected payoff $\frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0 = 1$
- playing gives expected payoff $\frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 = 1$
- playing $\mathcal{S}_{\text{cat}}$ is a mix of both
  $\hookrightarrow$ also expected payoff 1.

Content

Two Player Zero Sum Games

- Finite sets of pure strategies
  - S_1 for player 1
  - S_2 for player 2
- utility function $u : S_1 \times S_2 \to \mathbb{R}$
  - player 1 gets $u(s_1, s_2)$
  - player 2 gets $-u(s_1, s_2)$

Two Player Zero Sum Games and their Matrix Formulation

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- Implicit sets of pure strategies
  - $S_1 = [n]$ for the *row player*
  - $S_2 = [m]$ for the *column players*
- matrix $M \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$
  - row player gets M_{s_1, s_2}
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		0	-1	1
		1	0	-1
		-1	1	0

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Unique equilibrium of 

$\mathcal{S}_1 = \mathcal{S}_2 = \{$  $: \frac{1}{3},$  $: \frac{1}{3},$  $: \frac{1}{3}\}$

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

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

		-1	1	-1
		1	-1	1

Equilibria of

Work it out yourself!

Nash Equilibria for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

Nash's Theorem (1950), Special Case

For any $M \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$ there exist distributions $\mathcal{S}_1^*$ on $[n]$ and $\mathcal{S}_2^*$ on $[m]$ such that

$$\mathbb{E}_{s_1 \sim \mathcal{S}_1^*, s_2 \sim \mathcal{S}_2^*}[M_{s_1,s_2}] = \max_{s_1 \in [n]} \mathbb{E}_{s_2 \sim \mathcal{S}_2^*}[M_{s_1,s_2}] = \min_{s_2 \in [m]} \mathbb{E}_{s_1 \sim \mathcal{S}_1^*}[M_{s_1,s_2}].$$

Intuition

When the players play according to $\mathcal{S}_1^*$ and $\mathcal{S}_2^*$, then no player can benefit by deviating from his strategy.

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Corollary: Loomis (1946) Von Neumann (1928)

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No first-mover disadvantage if

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Proof of Corollary ("$\geq$")

$$\max_{\mathcal{S}_1} \min_{s_2 \in [m]} \mathbb{E}_{s_1 \sim \mathcal{S}_1}[M_{s_1,s_2}] \geq \min_{s_2 \in [m]} \mathbb{E}_{s_1 \sim \mathcal{S}_1^*}[M_{s_1,s_2}] \overset{\text{Nash}}{=} \max_{s_1 \in [n]} \mathbb{E}_{s_2 \sim \mathcal{S}_2^*}[M_{s_1,s_2}] \geq \min_{\mathcal{S}_2} \max_{s_1 \in [n]} \mathbb{E}_{s_2 \sim \mathcal{S}_2}[M_{s_1,s_2}]$$

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Proof of Corollary ("$\leq$")

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Algorithm Design as a 2-Player Zero-Sum Game

Setting

- P: a computational problem
- **Inputs**: *finite* set of inputs
- **Algos**: *finite* set of deterministic algorithms
- $C(A, I) \in \mathbb{R}$ cost of $A \in$ **Algos** on $I \in$ **Inputs**.

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Example: Sorting

- $P =$ "sort n numbers comparison-based"[a]
- **Inputs** $= S_n$ //permutations of $[n]$
- **Algos** $=$ e.g. suitable set of decision trees
- $C(A, I) =$ # of comparisons of A for input I

[a] n finite, though possibly $n \to \infty$ later.

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A Two-Player Zero-Sum Game

- Designer chooses (randomised) algorithm, i.e. a distribution on **Algos**.
  $\hookrightarrow$ Goal: Minimise (expected) cost.
- Adversary chooses (randomised) input, i.e. a distribution on **Inputs**.
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Sorting (x, y, z)

		Adversary $(1,2,3)$	$(3,1,2)$	$(2,3,1)$	...
Algorithm Designer	$x < y$ then $y < z$ then* $z < x$	2	3	3	
	$y < z$ then $z < x$ then* $x < y$	3	2	3	
	...				

* Only if needed.

Randomised Complexity and Yao's Principle

Definition: Randomised Complexity of a Problem

$$\mathcal{C} := \min_{\mathcal{A} \text{ dist. on } \textbf{Algos}} \max_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}}[C(A, I)]$$

designer moves first

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Upper Bounds on $\mathcal{C}$

Let $\mathcal{A}_0$ be a distribution on **Algos**

$$\max_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}_0}[C(A, I)] \overset{\text{(old news)}}{\geq} \mathcal{C}$$

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Yao's Principle: (Upper and) Lower Bounds on $\mathcal{C}$

Let $\mathcal{A}_0$ be a distribution on **Algos** and $\mathcal{I}_0$ a distribution on **Inputs**. Then

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Tightness: Loomis implies that "$=$" is possible.

Randomised Complexity and Yao's Principle

Definition: Randomised Complexity of a Problem

$$\mathcal{C} := \min_{\mathcal{A} \text{ dist. on } \textbf{Algos}} \max_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}}[C(A, I)] \qquad \text{designer moves first}$$

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$\hookrightarrow$ Can attain (tight) lower bounds on $\mathcal{C}$ by thinking about deterministic algorithm only!

Content

Computational Problem: $\overline{\wedge}$-Tree-Evaluation

Problem: Evaluate $\overline{\wedge}$-Tree of depth d

- **Inputs** $= \{0,1\}^n$ for $n = 2^d$. Specify bits at leafs.
- **Algos** $=$ Algorithms computing value at root.
- $C(A, I) = \#$ bits of I that A examines
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Goal

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

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Example and possible formalisation of **Algos** (that we won't use)

Each $A \in$ **Algos** corresponds to a *decision tree*. In the example:

Each leaf queried at most once per path
$\Rightarrow$ depth $\leq n \Rightarrow |\textbf{Algos}| < \infty$



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



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



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

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

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

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Deterministic Query Complexity is n (Übungsblatt 2, Aufgabe 3)

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Randomised Query Complexity is $\mathcal{O}(n^{\log_4(3)}) \approx \mathcal{O}(n^{0.792})$ (Lecture "The Power of Randomness")

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the randomised algorithm that evaluates one of the two depth $d-1$ subtrees at random (recursively) and, if that yields 1, also evaluates the other subtree (recursively).

$$\max_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}}[C(A, I)] = \mathcal{O}(3^{d/2}) = \mathcal{O}(n^{\log_4(3)}).$$

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Goal: Show lower bound of $\Omega(\varphi^d) \approx \Omega(n^{0.694})$ using Yao's Principle (φ is the golden ratio).

Remark: actual complexity is $\Theta(n^{\log_4(3)})$, but that's more difficult.

Warm Up: A simple lower bound

Observation

For any even $d \in \mathbb{N}$ and $A \in$ **Algos** we have $C(A, (0, \ldots, 0)) \geq 2^{d/2}$.



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

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

Proof

- in the end A knows that the root is 0.
- knowing a 0 requires knowing that both children are 1.
- Knowing a 1 requires knowing of one child that it is 0.

$\hookrightarrow$ A knows of $\geq 2^{d/2}$ leafs that they are 0 and must have checked them.

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

Corollary: Randomised Complexity is $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$

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\begin{aligned}
C &= \min_{\mathcal{A} \text{ dist. on } \textbf{Algos}} \max_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}}[C(A, I)] \\
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

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Note Yao's spirit: Lower bound on *randomised complexity* from result on *deterministic algorithms*.

A stronger lower bound



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Let $\mathcal{I}_p = \mathrm{Ber}(p)^n$ be the distribution where leafs are assigned independently values with distribution $\mathrm{Ber}(p)$.

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

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Theorem (Tarsi 1984)

For any $p \in [0,1]$ simpleEval is optimal for input distribution $\mathcal{I}_p$, i.e.

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

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

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

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

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

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- For $I \sim \mathcal{I}_{p_0}$ the probability that an *internal* tree node evaluates to 1 is p_0.

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Proof of Lemma: Cost of simpleEval on $\mathcal{I}_{p_0}$



Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Lemma

Let $\varphi = \frac{\sqrt{5}+1}{2}$ be the golden ratio and $p_0 = \varphi - 1$. Then

$$\mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_{p_0}}[C(\text{simpleEval}, I)] = (1 + p_0)^d = \varphi^d.$$

Proof.

- $p_0 = \frac{\sqrt{5}-1}{2}$ is the solution to $p = 1 - p^2$.
- If $a, b \sim \text{Ber}(p_0)$ then $a \overline{\wedge} b \sim \text{Ber}(1 - p_0^2) = \text{Ber}(p_0)$.
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- Let $c_d := \mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_{p_0}}[C(\text{simpleEval}, I)]$ for trees of depth d. Then

□

Deterministic Algorithm

Algorithm simpleEval(T)**:**

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if T = leaf(b) then
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    (T_ℓ, T_r) ← T
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

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

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  - $c_0 = 1$ // tree of depth 0 is just the leaf
  - $c_d = c_{d-1} + p_0 \cdot c_{d-1} = (1+p_0)c_{d-1} \overset{\text{Ind.}}{=} (1+p_0)(1+p_0)^{d-1} = (1+p_0)^d$
    // Always one recursive call, with probability p a second one.

□

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Content

Tarsi's Theorem

Theorem (Tarsi 1984)

For any $p \in [0,1]$ simpleEval is optimal for input distribution $\mathcal{I}_p$, i.e.

$$\min_{A \in \textbf{Algos}} \mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_{p_0}}[C(A, I)] = \mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_{p_0}}[C(\text{simpleEval}, I)].$$

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Proof idea:

- Take optimal Algorithm A.
- Transform A into simpleEval step by step.
- Show: Expected query complexity never increases.

Lemma: Evaluating Superleafs like simpleEval

Definition: Superleafs

A *superleaf* consists of two sibling leafs and their parent.



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

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For any $p \in [0, 1]$ and any $A \in$ **Algos** there exists $A' \in$ **Algos** such that

- $\mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_p}[C(A', I)] \leq \mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_p}[C(A, I)]$
- A' behaves on any superleaf $T = (\ell, r)$ like simpleEval:
  - i never visits r before ℓ
  - ii never visits r if $\ell = 0$
  - iii immediately visits r after visiting ℓ if $\ell = 1$

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

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Proof Idea

- We fix every superleaf one by one. Let T be superleaf that needs fixing.
- Property i: Switch roles of ℓ and r if needed. Does not change the expected cost.
- Property ii: r does not contribute to result. Not visiting r *reduces* expected cost.
- Property iii: More difficult. See next slide.

Modified Algorithm B

Original Algorithm A

Modified Algorithm D



Modified Algorithm B



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

Modified Algorithm D





$$C_A := \mathbb{E}[C(A,I)] = \mathbb{E}[C_0 + \bar{\alpha}\cdot(1 + \bar{p}C_1 + p\cdot(C_2 + \bar{\beta}(1 + \bar{p}C_3 + pC_4)))]$$
$$C_B := \mathbb{E}[C(B,I)] = \mathbb{E}[C_0 + \bar{\alpha}\cdot(1 + \bar{p}C_1 + p\cdot(1 + \bar{p}C_1 + p(C_2 + \bar{\beta}C_4)))]$$
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$$(C_B - C_A) + p\cdot(C_D - C_A) = \ldots = 0$$
$$\Rightarrow C_B - C_A \leq 0 \vee C_D - C_A \leq 0$$
$\Rightarrow$ B or D (or both) are at least as good as A and both visit superleaf (ℓ, r) as desired.

Theorem (Tarsi 1984)

For any $p \in [0,1]$ simpleEval is optimal for input distribution $\mathcal{I}_p$, i.e.

$$\min_{A \in \textbf{Algos}} \mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_{p_0}}[C(A, I)] = \mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_{p_0}}[C(\text{simpleEval}, I)].$$

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Hence, simpleEval is optimal for $\mathcal{I}_p$. □

Content

Ski Rental – A Prototypical Online Problem

Setting: You are on a ski trip

Trip lasts for unknown number of days $I \in \mathbb{N}$ (“as long as there is snow”).

Every day, if no skis bought yet:

- RENT skis for one day for cost 1 *or*
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Framing using Online Algorithms

- **Inputs** $= \mathbb{N}$: number of days (not known in advance)
- **Algos** $= \mathbb{N}$: specify day for choosing BUY
- cost for $A \in$ **Algos** on $I \in$ **Inputs**:

$$C(A, I) = \begin{cases} I & \text{if } I < A \\ A - 1 + B & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- cost of optimum *offline* solution

$$\mathrm{OPT}(I) = \begin{cases} I & \text{if } I < B \\ B & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

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Goal: Minimise Competitive Ratio

The *competitive ratio* of $A \in$ **Algos** is

$$C_A = \sup_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \frac{C(A, I)}{\mathrm{OPT}(I)}.$$

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Goal: Minimise Competitive Ratio

The *competitive ratio* of distribution $\mathcal{A}$ on **Algos** is

$$C_{\mathcal{A}} = \sup_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}}[C(A, I)]}{\mathrm{OPT}(I)}.$$

Framing using Online Algorithms

- **Inputs** $= \mathbb{N}$: number of days (not known in advance)
- **Algos** $= \mathbb{N}$: specify day for choosing BUY
- cost for $A \in$ **Algos** on $I \in$ **Inputs**:

$$C(A, I) = \begin{cases} I & \text{if } I < A \\ A - 1 + B & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- cost of optimum *offline* solution

$$\mathrm{OPT}(I) = \begin{cases} I & \text{if } I < B \\ B & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Break-Even is the best deterministic algorithm

Observation

The algorithm breakEven $:= B$ has competitive ratio $\frac{2B-1}{B} \approx 2$.
All other $A \in$ **Algos** have competitive ratio ≥ 2.

Recall

B is the cost to BUY.

Proof

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

The worst ratio for breakEven is attained for input $I = B$.

$$C_{\text{breakEven}} = \sup_{I \in \mathbb{N}} \frac{C(\text{breakEven}, I)}{\text{OPT}(I)} = \frac{C(\text{breakEven}, B)}{\text{OPT}(B)}$$
$$= \frac{B - 1 + B}{B} = \frac{2B-1}{B}.$$

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

The worst ratio for $A \in$ **Algos** with $A < B$ is attained for input $I = A$.

$$C_A = \sup_{I \in \mathbb{N}} \frac{C(A,I)}{\mathrm{OPT}(I)} = \frac{C(A,A)}{\mathrm{OPT}(A)} = \frac{A-1+B}{A} = 1 + \frac{B-1}{A} \geq 1+1 = 2.$$

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

The worst ratio for $A \in$ **Algos** with $A > B$ is attained for input $I = A$.

$$C_A = \sup_{I \in \mathbb{N}} \frac{C(A,I)}{\mathrm{OPT}(I)} = \frac{C(A,A)}{\mathrm{OPT}(A)} = \frac{A-1+B}{B} = 1 + \frac{A-1}{B} \geq 1+1 = 2.$$

A randomised algorithm can beat break-even

Observation (assuming wlog that B is a multiple of 3)

The randomised algorithm $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{U}(\{\frac{2}{3}B, B\})$ has competitive ratio $\approx 1 + \frac{5}{6}$.

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

The competitive ratio of $\mathcal{A}$ "spikes" for inputs $\frac{2}{3}B$ and B. It is decreasing in between and constant after B.

$$\mathbb{E}_{A\sim\mathcal{A}}[C(A, \tfrac{2}{3}B)] = \underbrace{\tfrac{2}{3}B - 1}_{\text{rent}} + \underbrace{\tfrac{1}{2}(1 + B)}_{\text{rent or buy}} < \tfrac{7}{6}B, \qquad \mathrm{OPT}(\tfrac{2}{3}B) = \tfrac{2}{3}B,$$

$$\mathbb{E}_{A\sim\mathcal{A}}[C(A, B)] = \underbrace{B}_{\text{buy}} + \underbrace{\tfrac{2}{3}B - 1}_{\text{rent}} + \underbrace{\tfrac{1}{2}(\tfrac{1}{3}B)}_{\text{maybe rent}} < \tfrac{11}{6}B, \qquad \mathrm{OPT}(B) = B.$$

Hence $C_{\mathcal{A}} = \sup_{I\in\mathbb{N}} \dfrac{\mathbb{E}_{A\sim\mathcal{A}}[C(A, I)]}{\mathrm{OPT}(I)} \leq \max\left\{\dfrac{7/6}{2/3}, \dfrac{11/6}{1}\right\} = \max\left\{\dfrac{7}{4}, \dfrac{11}{6}\right\} = \dfrac{11}{6}.$

What's next?

Goal: Lower bound

No randomised algorithm has competitive ratio better than $\frac{e-1}{e} \approx 1.582$.

Yao's Principle for Online Algorithms

Theorem (see Online Optimization Lecture, Corollary 3.8, Prof. Yann Disser, Darmstadt, 2023)

For any distribution $\mathcal{A}_0$ on **Algos**

$$C_{\mathcal{A}_0} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sup_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}_0}[C(A, I)]}{\mathrm{OPT}(I)} \geq \frac{\mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_0, A \sim \mathcal{A}_0}[C(A, I)]}{\mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_0}[\mathrm{OPT}(I)]}$$

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Remark

- Yao's principle exists for other settings as well.
- Proof of "$\geq$" relatively easy to prove.
- Tightness typically follows from duality of optimisation problems or fixed point theorems.
  (though I'm not sure how it works here)

A hard distribution for Ski-Rental: Intuition

$$\mathcal{I}_0 := \mathsf{Geom}_1(\tfrac{1}{B}).$$

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Why $\mathcal{I}_0$?

- distribution is **memoryless**, i.e. $\Pr_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[I = i + t \mid I > i] = \Pr_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[I = t]$.
  Assume no skis bought on day i: Minimising expected *future* cost is the same problem as on day 1.
  $\hookrightarrow$ wlog: either buy right away or not at all.

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  Assume no skis bought on day i: Minimising expected *future* cost is the same problem as on day 1.
  $\hookrightarrow$ wlog: either buy right away or not at all.
- **expectation** tuned such that

$$\mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[C(\text{never buy}, I)] = \mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[C(\text{immediately buy}, I)] = B.$$

  $\hookrightarrow$ all strategies equally good

A hard distribution for Ski-Rental: Analysis

Lemma

Let $\mathcal{I}_0 := \text{Geom}(\frac{1}{B})$ *and* $q := 1 - \frac{1}{B} =$ "Pr[❄]"*. Then*

i. $\mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[C(A, I)] = B$ *for all* $A \in \mathbb{N}$.

ii. $\mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[\text{OPT}(I)] = B(1 - (1 - \frac{1}{B})^B)$.

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Proof of (i)

$$\mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[C(A, I)] = \underbrace{\Pr[I \geq A] \cdot B}_{\text{buy}} + \sum_{i=1}^{A-1} \underbrace{\Pr[I \geq i] \cdot 1}_{\text{rent}}$$

$$= q^{A-1} \cdot B + \sum_{i=1}^{A-1} q^{i-1} = q^{A-1} \cdot B + \sum_{i=0}^{A-2} q^i = q^{A-1} \cdot B + \frac{1 - q^{A-1}}{1 - q}$$

$$= q^{A-1} \cdot B + (1 - q^{A-1})B = B.$$

A hard distribution for Ski-Rental: Analysis

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Let $\mathcal{I}_0 := \text{Geom}(\frac{1}{B})$ *and* $q := 1 - \frac{1}{B} =$ "$\Pr[$❄$]$". *Then*

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Tail sum formula:

For random variable X with values in $\mathbb{N}$:

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \sum_{j\geq 1} \Pr[X \geq j].$$

Proof of (ii)

$$\mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[\text{OPT}(I)] \overset{\text{TSF}}{=} \sum_{j\geq 1} \Pr[\text{OPT}(I) \geq j] = \sum_{j=1}^{B} \Pr[\text{OPT}(I) \geq j]$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^{B} \Pr[I \geq j] = \sum_{j=1}^{B} q^{j-1} = \sum_{j=0}^{B-1} q^j$$

$$= \frac{1-q^B}{1-q} = B(1-(1-\tfrac{1}{B})^B).$$



Note: $\text{OPT}(I) = I$ for $I \in [B]$.

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Lower bound for Ski-Rental

By Yao's theorem any randomised algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ for ski-rental has competitive ratio at least

$$C_{\mathcal{A}} \overset{\text{Yao}}{\geq} \frac{\inf_{A\in\textbf{Algos}} \mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[C(A,I)]}{\mathbb{E}_{I\sim\mathcal{I}_0}[\mathrm{OPT}(I)]} = \frac{B}{B(1-(1-\frac{1}{B})^B)} = \frac{1}{1-(1-\frac{1}{B})^B}.$$

For large B the lower bound converges to $\lim_{B\to\infty} \frac{1}{1-(1-\frac{1}{B})^B} = \frac{1}{1-1/e} = \frac{e}{e-1} \approx 1.582$.

Upper bound for Ski-Rental

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Remark: The lower bound is tight (Karlin et al. 1994)

There exists a distribution $\mathcal{A}$ on $[B]$ such that $c_{\mathcal{A}} \leq \frac{e}{e-1}$.

Upper bound for Ski-Rental

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Remark: The lower bound is tight (Karlin et al. 1994)

There exists a distribution $\mathcal{A}$ on $[B]$ such that $c_{\mathcal{A}} \leq \frac{e}{e-1}$.

Applications

Very basic online question:

Should I pay a small possibly recurring cost or a large one time cost?

Occurs in:

- Cache management.
- Networking.
- Scheduling.
- ...

Conclusion

Algorithm Design as a Two-Player Game

- “we” choose algorithm to minimise cost
- “adversary” chooses input to maximise cost
- Nash/Loomis: It does not matter who moves first
  if mixed strategy is allowed for first player.

Yao’s Principle

Lower bound on worst-case expected cost of *any randomised algorithm* $\mathcal{A}_0$ by analying *any deterministic algorithm* on specific input distribution $\mathcal{I}_0$.

$$\max_{I \in \textbf{Inputs}} \mathbb{E}_{A \sim \mathcal{A}_0}[C(A, I)] \geq \mathcal{C} \geq \min_{A \in \textbf{Algos}} \mathbb{E}_{I \sim \mathcal{I}_0}[C(A, I)].$$

Can narrow down randomised complexity $\mathcal{C}$ of underlying problem from both sides.

Anhang: Mögliche Prüfungsfragen I

Spieltheorie:

- Was ist ein Zwei-Spieler-Spiel im Sinne der Spieltheorie?
- Was ist ein Nash-Equilibrium?
- Gibt es immer ein Nash-Equilibrium?
- Was ist ein Nullsummenspiel?
- Was besagt der Satz von Nash (für Zwei-Spieler Nullsummenspiele)?
- Was besagt der Satz von Loomis?
- Beweise den Satz von Loomis! (anspruchsvolle Aufgabe)

Yaos Prinzip:

- Worin besteht die Verbindung zwischen Spieltheorie und dem Entwurf von Algorithmen?
- Wie ist die randomisierte Komplexität (bzgl. einer Kostenfunktion C) normalerweise definiert? Welche andere Sichtweise ergibt sich darauf durch den Satz von Loomis?
- Formuliere Yaos Prinzip! Wofür ist es nützlich?

Anhang: Mögliche Prüfungsfragen II

Anwendung auf $\overline{\wedge}$-Bäume:

- Welches Ziel haben wir uns bei der Auswertung von $\overline{\wedge}$-Bäumen gesetzt? (Anfragekomplexität minimieren)
- Welche Worst-Case Kosten lassen sich mit einem deterministischen Algorithmus erreichen?
- Können randomisierte Algorithmen das besser? Wie?
- Man kann sich recht leicht überlegen, dass die randomisierte Komplexität $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$ beträgt. Wie ging das?
- Wir haben auch eine schärfere Analyse gesehen. Welche Komponenten hatte diese? Insbesondere: Wie kommt dabei Yao Prinzip zur Anwendung?
- Was besagt der Satz von Tarsi?

Ski-Rental-Problem:

- Formuliere das Ski-Rental Problem.
- Wie nennt man diese Art von Problem? (*Online* Problem)
- Spielt das nur im Wintersport eine Rolle? (nur Stichworte)
- Wie ist der kompetitive Faktor definiert?

Anhang: Mögliche Prüfungsfragen III

- Was ist der beste deterministische Algorithmus? Wie kann man das einsehen?
- Gibt es einen randomisierten Algorithmus der Break-Even schlagen kann? (nur die Idee)
- Formuliere Yaos Prinzip für Online Algorithmen.
- Welche Eingabeverteilung haben wir für die untere Schranke für Ski-Rental zugrunde gelegt? Was ist die Intuition?
- Welche Kosten ergeben sich für Online und Offline Algorithmen für diese Eingabeverteilung? Was lässt sich entsprechend über den kompetitiven Faktor sagen?